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ABSTRACT
We investigate differences in deviant behavior between temporary
workers and permanent workers and study the moderating role of
workplace cohesion. We distinguish between task cohesion, which
reflects the way colleagues work together as a team to complete
tasks, and social cohesion, which reflects how well colleagues relate.
We predict that task cohesion and social cohesion prompt norms on
tolerating group members’ deviant behavior and test our hypotheses
on the Work and Politics 2016 data set, consisting of 787 Dutch
employees. We find that temporary work does not lead to deviant
behavior per se, but its effect on deviant behavior is moderated by
workplace cohesion. We conclude that the distinction between task
cohesion and social cohesion is crucial for understanding the effect of
temporary work on deviant behavior.
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Western European labor markets have witnessed a strong increase in flexible work since the late
1970s and early 1980s as a response to economic crises and increasing globalization (Kalleberg,
Reskin, and Hudson 2000). Temporary employment, i.e., employees with temporary labor
contracts, as a share of the total employment, has almost doubled in EU-28 countries between
1980 and 2015, increasing from 8.3% to 14.2% (OECD 2017). The strong growth of temporary
work can be explained by various benefits that are attributed to the use of temporary employ-
ment. Temporary employment is considered to be a powerful brake on unemployment (Gebel
2013) because it would offer an intermediate step between unemployment and permanent
contracts, particularly when employment protection on permanent employments is rigid
(Hijzen, Mondauto, and Scarpetta 2017). Moreover, temporary work has been welcomed as an
important tool for employers to easily adjust the size of the personnel to changing economic
circumstances, such as cyclical fluctuations in demand and supply (De Grip, Hoevenberg, and
Willems 1997). In addition, temporary workers are also considered to be a buffer to protect
permanent employees from dismissal (De Jong, Schalk, andGoessling 2007;Muffels 2014; Olsen
2004).
Temporary work, however, may come at a price. The hiring of temporary employees in the
organization may signal job insecurity and low commitment of the organization to the perma-
nent workers: Davis-Blake, Broschak, and George (2003) find that blending temporary workers
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with standard workers increases the exit levels and unionization levels of standard workers and
destabilizes the work environment. Hirsch and Mueller (2012) find that a firm’s productivity
gains when hiring temporary workers first increase because firms canmore easily adjust to peaks
and drops in demands but fall when the percentage of temporary workers in firms is greater than
15%. Hirsch and Mueller propose that temporary employees’ lack of firm-specific knowledge is
responsible for the productivity fall.Moreover, the threat of high numbers of temporary workers
may pose a threat to the firms’ permanent workers, which would negatively affect their moral,
nullifying initial gains in the productivity associated with the hiring of temporary workers.
Psychological research signals lower performance of temporary workers themselves who would
be less committed to the organization andwould commitmore deviant behavior due to the stress
related to the persistent threat of future unemployment (Sverke,Hellgren, andNäswall 2002) and
perceptions of unfair treatment (De Cuyper et al. 2008). However, the empirical evidence for
negative effects of temporary employment on work-related behavior is, more often than not,
inconclusive (Berntson et al. 2010; De Cuyper et al. 2008; Sverke, Hellgren, and Näswall 2002).
In this study, we extend the understanding of both the literature on temporary work and
the literature on employee behavior. First, we investigate the effect of temporary work on
a neglected extreme of the spectrum of employee behavior (Connelly and Gallagher 2004):
deviant behavior. Deviant behavior is behavior that deviates from a significant organizational
norm and that is harmful to an organization and its members (Robinson and Bennett 1995).
We hypothesize that temporary workers display higher levels of deviant behavior, because
they have more grievances and fewer opportunities to voice complaints than permanent
workers. Our first research question therefore is ¨To what extent do temporary workers differ
from permanent workers in their display of deviant behavior?” (RQ1)
Our second contribution to both streams of literature is that we take the moderating role of
workplace cohesion into consideration. While temporary workers are more prone to engage in
workplace deviance, engaging in such behavior is conditioned by the opportunities to do so.We
argue that workplace cohesion is an important condition for engaging in deviant behavior.
Workplace cohesion shapes opportunities to engage in deviant behavior. A lack of cohesion is
commonly associated with deviant behavior at work (Itzkovich and Heilbrunn 2016; Karau and
Williams 1997). The mechanisms of (informal) social control associated with cohesion affects
deviant behavior (Coleman 1994). To study the moderating effect of cohesion, we distinguish
between task cohesion and social cohesion, following Zaccaro (1991). Task cohesion refers to
groups that work together to reach the goals that are set within an organization, and social
cohesion refers to the way people relate within an organization.We derive the hypotheses based
on the assumption that these aspects of cohesion prompt competing norms in tolerating group
members’ deviant behavior. We scrutinize the effect of task cohesion and social cohesion on the
relationship between temporary workers and deviant behavior. Hence, the second research
question is “To what extent do task cohesion and social cohesion moderate the relationship
between temporary work and deviant behavior?” (RQ2).
To test these hypotheses, we apply an OLS regression analysis using the Work and
Politics 2016 data set. This data set contains information about wage-employed respon-
dents in the Netherlands (N = 787). The Dutch context offers an interesting setting to
study the relationship between temporary work and deviant behavior for two reasons.
First, compared to other European countries, the use of temporary work is relatively high
in the Netherlands (De Lange 2013). In the early 1980s, the Netherlands ranked low in
terms of temporary workers – only 5.8 in 1983 – compared to an average of 8.3 in the EU-
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28 counties. However, the share of temporary workers quickly rose to 20.5% in 2015,
almost 50 percent higher than the average in the EU-28 countries (Eurostat 2015). An
important factor in the rise of the use of temporary contracts is the relatively large gap
between the employment protection of workers on a permanent contract and that workers
on a temporary contract.1 Second, new regulations were adopted in 2015 with the
intention to encourage employers to offer permanent contracts to temporary workers,
mainly by reducing employment protections of permanent employees, introducing a fee
for employers when temporary workers leave the company when their contract ends, and
by reducing the maximum length of temporary contracts and the number of subsequent
temporary contracts. The effectivity of these new regulations are being heavily debated,
both in the media and academia, and the regulations are sometimes considered counter-
productive (Kremer, Went, and Knottnerus 2017). However, to date, there has not been
a thorough evaluation of the effects of the new regulation, while still other adoptions in
employment protection legislation are awaiting approval of the Dutch Senate.2
Theory
Temporary Work and Deviant Behavior
Deviant workplace behavior hasmany labels – “neglect”, “lax and disregardful behavior” (Farrell
1983; Kolarska and Aldrich 1980; Rusbult, Zembrodt, and Gunn 1982), “counterproductive
work behavior” (Brock, Martin, and Buckley 2013), “employee deviance” (Hollinger 1986) and
“organizational retaliatory behavior” (Skarlicki and Folger 1997) – and comprises a diverse set of
intentional and destructive behaviors that harm the organization and thosewhowork there, such
as tardiness, dawdling, petty theft, obstruction, harassment, bullying and discrimination
(Analoui & Kakabadse, 1993; Robinson and Bennett 1995). While some strands of literature
conceptualize such behaviors as deviant, the Sociology of Work, in particular Labor Process
Theory, conceives such behaviors as “acts of resistance”. When workers are frustrated in their
need to accomplish pride in doing their job well and lose dignity at work, e.g. because of
mismanagement or abuse, acts of resistance are used to take back control of their dignity. In
this conception, anti-organizational behaviors are expressions of grievances about the work
situations (Hodson 2001; Lucas et al. 2017; Paulsen 2015; Roscigno and Hodson 2004; Vallas
2003, 2006).
We distinguish three potential mechanisms by which temporary workers have a higher
risk of displaying deviant behavior.3 First, theories of work psychology (cf. De Cuyper
et al. 2008; De Witte 2005) suggest that temporary work increases work-related stress
through the persistent threat of future unemployment, low investments of employers in
temporary workers (such as training) and the often poor job characteristics of temporary
work, such as little influence on work-related decisions and little support from coworkers.
Work-related stress induces frustration and coping mechanisms, such as withdrawal,
resulting in absenteeism, tardiness and resignation (De Witte 2005; Omar et al. 2011).
Second, temporary workers are more prone to perceptions of unfair treatment. Due to
the less favorable job characteristics of temporary work – for instance, the previously
mentioned lower opportunities for training and lower wages – temporary workers are
more inclined to suffer a “psychological contract breach” (Robinson and Bennett 1995).
This mechanism sets in when employees feel that the employer breaks a promise by
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providing poorer working conditions (e.g., low wages, fewer career opportunities) or little
influence over decisions in the organization (Brockner et al. 2001; Lucas et al. 2017). Such
feelings of injustice or indignity may provoke emotional outrage reducing motivation and
provoking revenge manifested through deviant, noncooperative behavior and intentionally
deviant behavior (Bordia, Restubog, and Tang 2008; Tucker 1989; Van Adrichem and
Koster 2013) to restore a sense of justice (Greenberg 1990) and dignity (Hodson 2001;
Lucas et al. 2017). In explaining why some workers who perceive psychological contract
violation engage in deviant behavior while others do not, psychological research refers to
differences in personal dispositions, such as narcissism (e.g., Penney and Spector 2002).
We argue that workers may feel that the organization breaks a promise or treats them
unfairly but may first consider voicing their discontent to solve the problem before they
turn against the interest of the organization (Coyle-Shapiro and Conway 2004).
Third, we link the previous two mechanisms, and expect that temporary workers may
have more grievances than permanent employees but are also more prone to having little
or no options to voice complaints. Temporary workers have fewer incentives and oppor-
tunities to voice discontent about working conditions, while the risks associated with
voicing discontent are higher. For temporary workers, the traditional vehicles for collec-
tive expressions of discontent (for example, representation by a union or the Works
Council or through striking) are less accessible and less appealing. Unions consider
temporary workers a problematic group to represent: they are difficult to reach, and
their interests are more heterogeneous, which makes flexible workers a non-cohesive
target (Bacon and Storey 1993; Croucher and Brewster 1998; Jansen and Akkerman
2014; Jansen, Akkerman, and Vandaele 2017). Moreover, because of unions’ traditional
interests and the appeal to cohesiveness and solidarity, temporary workers themselves feel
less represented by the union, which in turn reduces temporary workers’ options for
collective voice (Jansen and Akkerman, 2014; Jansen et al., 2017). In general, temporary
workers have a weaker structural position within an organization, and because of the
short-term contracts, they seldom benefit from the long-term gains of collective actions
(e.g., a wage increase after a strike). Individual options to voice discontent are even more
costly and less effective for workers with temporary contracts. Individual workers are
more observable when expressing dissatisfaction, and hence, more vulnerable to retalia-
tion (Born, Akkerman, and Thommes, 2016). Employers may retaliate against employees
filing complaints by inducing them to leave the organization (Hirschman 1970; Near and
Miceli 1986; Svensson and van Genugten 2013). Workers on temporary contracts who
express their dissatisfaction are relatively easily forced out by withholding tenure.
Consequently, the expression of dissatisfaction to improve work and employment condi-
tions – voice – is either less available or accessible; it is perceived as less effective and is
therefore less attractive to temporary workers. Research into voice at work (implicitly)
suggests that workers who lack credible opportunities to express their dissatisfaction –
particularly those who lack alternative job opportunities (Berntson et al. 2010) – are
effectively are left with no alternative but to suffer in silence (i.e., may simply wait out
the contract) or are tempted to engage in deviant behavior (Lucas et al. 2017).
Thus, the reduced opportunities for temporary workers to voice their discontent may direct
them toward engagement in deviant behavior as a way of expressing discontent, a means to
restore justice and dignity and release work stress. We thus hypothesize that temporary workers
more often engage in deviant behavior than employees with a permanent contract (Hypothesis 1).
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The Effect of Cohesion
We argue that the relationship between temporary work and deviant behavior ismoderated by
workplace cohesion. Generally, cohesion prevents employees from defying their groups and
neglecting their jobs (Bennett and Naumann 2005). Karau and Williams (1997), for example,
suggest that “social loafing” (i.e., the tendency of individuals to exert less effort when working
collectively) can be reduced when individuals work in cohesive rather than non-cohesive
groups. Likewise, Kidwell and Bennett (2001) and Kidwell and Robie (2003) find that
perceived cohesiveness within a work group is negatively related to an employee’s level of
job neglect, such as withholding effort on the job. Itzkovich and Heilbrunn (2016) show that
coworkers’ solidarity reduces deviant behavior at work. However, these studies ignore the fact
that workplace cohesion does not always favor the interest of the organization.
Research on the effect of workplace cohesion on organizational outcomes, such as team
performance, distinguishes two dimensions of cohesion: task cohesion and social cohesion
(Carron, Widmeyer, and Brawley 1985; Mullen and Copper 1994). Task cohesion reflects
the way colleagues work as a team to complete tasks and achieve the teams’ targets. Social
cohesion reflects how colleagues relate to each other. Mullen and Copper (1994) show that
whereas task cohesion is positively correlated with team performance, social cohesion is
not. To explain the different effect of social cohesion and task cohesion, it is important to
understand the mechanisms by which cohesive groups influence the behavior of its
members. Cohesive groups in general – but also in organizations – share norms about
the ways to behave in a group (Coleman 1994; Durkheim 1951[1897]; Koster et al. 2007;
Robinson and O’Leary-Kelly 1998; Akkerman, Born, and Torenvlied, 2013; Born,
Akkerman, and Torenvlied, 2013; Thommes and Akkerman, 2018) and members who
deviate from such norms will be punished by other group members (Horne 2001). Thus,
punishment of norm deviation may correct deviant behavior as long as this deviant
behavior undermines the norms and objectives of the group. However, according to
Kitts (2006), groups can have rivaling norms. We argue that task cohesion and social
cohesion may create such rival incentives for (anti) organizational behavior.
In the case of task cohesion, the group is focused on the functioning of a team to reach
the organizational goals. Behavior that endangers these goals, such as deviant behavior, is
therefore punished. We thus expect that task cohesion will reduce deviant behavior
because workers in task-cohesive teams or organizations will be discouraged by their
group members to display such behavior. With respect to social cohesion, however,
groups are more focused on the group itself and the preservation of good relations within
the group. Here, the group norms do not necessarily coincide with the organizational
norms or commitment to tasks but rather are aimed at protecting the group and its
members (Horne 2001). Since monitoring and reprimanding others’ behavior jeopardizes
the persistence of social ties, it is less likely that members of social cohesive groups will be
rebuked in the case of deviant behavior. This does not necessarily mean that members of
social cohesive groups are more prone to displaying deviant behavior. However, when the
occasion arises and the team or (one of) its members acts against the organization, those
engaging in anti-organization behavior are less likely to be punished. Moreover, group
norms may also prescribe deviant behavior (Robinson and O’Leary-Kelly 1998), e.g.
in situations in which the groups uses deviant behavior as act of resistance to lack of
dignity in work. If norms in favor of deviant behaviors prevail, workers not engaging in
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deviant behavior may be seen as norm defector, and punished for it. Therefore, in addition
to lack of monitoring and sanctioning mechanism, a norm to deviate may exist in socially
cohesive groups, whereas norms to engage in acts of resistances are less likely strong task
cohesive groups (cf. Lucas et al. 2017; Vallas 2003:220).
As we predicted in Hypothesis 1, temporary workers are more tempted to display acts of
anti-organization behavior as a result of less favorable job characteristics and fewer opportu-
nities to voice discontent. The avoidance of reprimanding and punishing deviant behavior in
socially cohesive teams provides temporary workers opportunities to engage in deviant
behavior since other team members probably turn a blind eye in such cases. Temporary
work may stimulate anti-organizational behavior, which may even be more likely when social
cohesion is high. Remember that – as argued for Hypothesis 1 – compared to permanent
workers, the risks associated with deviant behavior are already lower for temporary workers
since no permanent contract is at stake, and the probability to engage in deviant behavior as
“act of resistance” may be higher. High levels of social cohesion may thus reduce those risks
even further. We therefore expect that the relationship between temporary work and deviant
behavior is stronger when social cohesion is higher (Hypothesis 2).
Parallel to this, we expect that the preventive effect of task cohesion on deviant behavior is
stronger for temporary workers, because temporary workers have a higher tendency to display
deviant behavior to begin with. Temporary workers are therefore more prone to be subject to
the disciplining norms of task cohesive groups. We thus expect that the relationship between
temporary work and deviant behavior is weaker when task cohesion is higher (Hypothesis 3).
Data and Measurements
Description of the Data Set
We use the Work and Politics 2016 (WOPO2016) data set (Akkerman et al., 2016) to
answer the research questions. This dataset is funded by the Nijmegen School of
Management of the Radboud University Nijmegen and the Netherlands Organization
for Scientific Research (NWO). WOPO2016 is a one-time questionnaire that contains
information about attitudes and behavior in politics, work, and employment of members
of the Dutch LISS (Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences) panel, adminis-
tered by CentERdata (Tilburg University, the Netherlands). Data were gathered between
December 2015 and January 2016. The survey was presented to 2,087 randomly selected
panel members between 18 and 65 years old. Of these members, 620 did not participate in
the survey, resulting in a 70% response rate. Ultimately, the Work and Politics data set
contains information from 1,467 respondents. Slightly more women (54%) than men
(46%) participated in the survey. The average age of the respondents is 45. Compared
to the Dutch population in the same age category (Dutch Statistics 2016), women, people
older than 55, and individuals with higher education levels are overrepresented, while
younger people (18 to 34 years old) and people with lower education levels are under-
represented in our dataset.
For the purpose of this study, we selected respondents based on two criteria. First, since
we examine differences between temporary and permanent employees, we only selected
respondents in waged labor (N = 862), and thus excluding for instance, self-employed,
unemployed or retired respondents. Second, because we examine the moderating role of
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workplace cohesion, we only selected respondents with colleagues. After a list-wise dele-
tion of missing observations, our data set contains information from 787 respondents.
Deviant Workplace Behavior
To account for deviant workplace behavior, we use a typology constructed by Robinson
and Bennett (1995). This typology distinguishes four types of deviant workplace behaviors
based on two dimensions: the seriousness or harmfulness of the act and the target of the
act (other persons or the organization). Production deviance entails minor acts of deviant
behavior aimed at the organization, such as wasting time during work. Property deviance
refers to serious acts of deviant behavior aimed at the organization, such as stealing
company property/funds. Political deviance encompasses minor deviant acts aimed at
others, such as showing favoritism. Personal aggression reflects serious deviant behavior
aimed at others in the organization, such as verbal abuse. The Work and Politics 2016
questionnaire includes a list of fourteen examples of deviant behavior that reflects
production deviance, property deviance and personal aggression but does not include
items on political deviance. The respondents were asked to indicate how often they have
engaged in any such acts. The answer categories include (1) never, (2) sometimes, (3)
regularly, and (4) often. Given that relatively few respondents indicated that they dis-
played most acts regularly or often, we combined the latter two answer categories. Table 1
presents a frequency table for the items reflecting deviant behavior.
We applied principal component analyses with oblique (oblimin) rotation. Two items
were removed from the analyses due to weak loadings. Table 2 presents the outcomes of
the final analysis. Using Kaiser’s criterion, we found a three-component solution. The
three components explained 45 percent of the variance. The items with the strongest
loadings on the first component have in common that they reflect more extreme forms of
organizational behavior, such as drugs- or alcohol use in the work place, misuse of
company finances and business information. This component thus reflects property




DRUGS Used drugs or alcohol in the workplace 918 33 8
INVOI Falsified invoices to receive more money than you were entitled 925 29 5
CONFI Discussed confidential business information with s/o who was not
allowed to know
878 75 6
OTIME Extended work to obtain overtime 903 47 9
SICK Called in sick when you were no longer sick 863 85 11
Production Deviance
NBEST Too often not doing your best at work 716 227 16
BREAK Took too many or excessively long breaks at work than acceptable 691 242 26
SLOW Intentionally worked more slowly than you were able 764 180 15
DAYDR Wasted too much time fantasizing and daydreaming 613 305 41
SLATE Started late without permission 801 148 10
Personal Aggression
INSUL Insulted someone at work 736 204 19
RUDE Treated someone at work rudely 848 101 10
YELL Yelled at someone at work 836 115 8
DISCR Made a comment about someone’s ethnicity or religion 843 97 19
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deviance. The items with the strongest loadings on the second component reflect produc-
tion deviance: these items are related to wasting time during working hours and neglecting
one’s work. The items that load strong on the third component deal with interpersonal
misbehavior at the workplace, such as insulting people or yelling at people. These items
thus reflect personal aggression. We calculated the factor scores for each component, which
serve as the dependent variables in our analyses. Factors scores are centered at the mean,
which is set at zero, thus respondents engaging below average, have negative scores. By
using factors scores we take into account that acts of deviant behavior can vary in the
extent to which they relate to the type of deviance as well as the fact that most acts of
deviance constitutes more than one type of deviant behavior. For example, calling in sick,
while not being sick, constitutes property deviance (stealing time and money through paid
sick leave from the employer) as well as (to a lesser extent) production deviance (disrupt-
ing the production process while absent).
To account for the scales’ reliability, we computed the Cronbach’s alpha for the items
with the strongest loadings on each component. The Cronbach’s alpha for each factor
indicated (highly) reliable scales (α = .82 for property deviance, α = .76 for production
deviance and α = .74 for personal aggression).
Contract Type
We distinguish between temporary workers and standard workers. First, temporary work-
ers are people with a fixed-term contract without the prospect of a permanent contract.
Additionally, temporary workers are employees who work via an employment agency or
have a zero-hour contract or payroll contract. Standard workers are employees with
a permanent contract or a fixed-term contract with the prospect of a permanent contract.
This operationalization is in line with the definition of flexible work of Dutch Statistics
(2015) and strongly resembles those used in previous studies on temporary workers using
various labels, such as contingent workers and contract workers (Connelly and Gallagher
2004). In our analyses, 135 respondents are temporary workers, and 652 respondents are
standard workers.








Used drugs or alcohol in the workplace 0,75 −0,06 0,07
Falsified invoices to receive more money than you were entitled to 0,75 −0,09 0,11
Discussed confidential business information with s/o who was not
allowed to know
0,63 0,04 −0,00
Stretched work to get overtime 0,62 0,16 −0,02
Called in sick, while you (no longer) were 0,52 0,29 −0,09
Intentionally worked slower than you could 0,03 0,68 −0,02
Too often not doing your best at work 0,02 0,66 −0,03
Took too many or too long breaks at work than acceptable −0,02 0,62 0,06
Wasted too much time fantasizing and daydreaming −0,02 0,54 0,06
Started late without permission 0,09 0,50 0,08
Yelled at someone at work 0,06 0,01 0,66
Insulted someone at work −0,08 0,07 0,66
Treated someone at work rudely 0,02 0,05 0,62
Made a comment about someone’s ethnicity or religion 0,29 −0,03 0,45
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Task Cohesion and Social Cohesion
To account for task cohesion and social cohesion, the respondents were presented a list of
eight items reflecting both aspects of cohesion, adapted from Sampson, Raudenbush, and
Earls (1997) and Carless and De Paola (2000) (see Table 3). For each item, the respondents
were asked to indicate whether they (1) totally disagreed, (2) disagreed, (3) neither agreed
nor disagreed, (4) agreed, (5) totally agreed with the statements, or whether the item was
not applicable to their situation (6). The last category was treated as a missing value. We
conducted a principal component analysis with oblique (oblimin) rotation. One item was
removed from the analyses due to cross loading on both items. The final analysis identified
two components, explaining 63% of the variance.
Table 3 presents the factor loadings of the itemsmeasuring workplace cohesion. The first four
items have high loadings on the first component and are related to collaboration between
employees to achieve targets. We label this component “task cohesion”. The three items that
loaded on the second component are related to workplace cohesion transcending working hours
and theworkplace. These items reflect the extent towhich colleagues are also part of the social life
of respondents, even outside working hours. Following the Carron, Widmeyer, and Brawley
(1985) distinction, we label this component “social cohesion”. To account for task cohesion and
social cohesion, we calculated the factor scores for both components. The Cronbach’s alpha for
task cohesion (α = .84) indicated a (highly) reliable scale; for social cohesion, the alpha is
moderate (α = .68).
Control Variables
To account for compositional differences between temporary and permanent workers that may
drive differences in deviant behavior, we control for sex, age, educational level, union member-
ship, job satisfaction, and the number of working hours. Sex is calculated as 0 for females and 1
for males. Age is measured as a logarithmic function of the respondents’ age. Educational
attainment is measured with a categorical variable. The respondents were asked about the
highest educational degree (s)he had completed, with nine answer categories ranging from
primary education to a post-academic degree. We recoded this variable into three dummy
variables: low (i.e., primary or lower secondary education, the reference category), middle (i.e.,
higher secondary or mid-level tertiary education) and high (i.e., higher tertiary education).
Union membership is a dichotomous variable that measures whether the respondent is
a member of a labor union. The number of working hours measures the number of working
hours per week, as specified in the contract. To account for potentially different levels of job
Table 3. Principal components analyses with oblimin rotation: Workplace cohesion (N = 837).
1 2
Task Cohesion Social Cohesion
The people at my work can be trusted 0,88 −0,05
The people at my work are always willing to help each other 0,84 0,01
The people at my work have the same norms and values 0,80 0,07
Our team works well together to achieve the set goals 0,75 −0,02
My colleagues are my most important social contacts −0,04 0,84
Some colleagues are also my best friends −0,07 0,83
The people of my team would like to spend more time together,
also outside working hours
0,13 0,65
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satisfaction between permanent and temporary workers, we also control for job satisfaction. To
measure job satisfaction, the respondents were asked to indicate how satisfied they arewith seven
aspects in their current job. These aspects include (a.o.) how interesting the job is, the work
climate, the superiors, and the salary. The answer categories ranged from (1) not at all satisfied to
(5) satisfied. A principal component analysis showed that the items resembled a unidimensional
concept. To avoid the loss of respondents due to missing values for some of the items, we
computed an index scale measuring the mean satisfaction of the job aspects, allowing two
missing values at most per respondent. The Cronbach’s alpha of this scale is .86, indicating
a highly reliable scale.
Table 4 presents an overview of the mean and standard deviation for each variable in
our analyses.4 This table also shows the descriptive statistics for each variable separately
for permanent and temporary employees. Based on a t-test (or chi2 test in the case of sex,
educational level and union membership), we further indicate whether the differences
between permanent and temporary employees are statistically significant. We find that
temporary employees more often engage in the three aspects of workplace deviance.
Furthermore, we see that temporary employees experience more social cohesion and less
task cohesion. Temporary employees are also younger than permanent employees, are less
likely to be a member of a union and are less satisfied with their jobs. We find no
significant differences between permanent and temporary employees in terms of sex,
educational level and the number of working hours.
Results
We appliedOLS regression analyses to test the hypotheses. For each dependent variable, we start
with the effects of the contract type dummy and the variables related to workplace cohesion.We
add the control variables in the subsequent model. Finally, we include the interaction terms
between the contract type and both aspects of workplace cohesion. Table 5 to 7 present the









M (%) SD Min Max M (%) SD M (%) SD
Property Deviance 0.00 0.85 −0.34 7.25 −0.07 0.68 0.34 1.37***
Production Deviance 0.00 0.88 −0.73 5.33 −0.05 0.80 0.25 1.13**
Personal Aggression 0.00 0.86 −0.57 5.62 −0.05 0.74 0.23 1.30*
Temporary Contract 17% 0.00 1.00
Social Cohesion 0.00 0.99 −1.78 2.95 −0.05 0.97 0.23 1.07**
Task Cohesion 0.00 1.01 −3.55 1.75 0.05 0.99 −0.23 1.06**
Control Variables
Sex (Reference = Female) 51% 0.00 1.00 50% 55%
Age 44.53 11.93 18.00 65.00 45.75 11.34 38.63 12.97***
Age (Logged) 3.18 0.60 0.00 3.87 3.25 0.51 2.82 0.82***
Educational Level
Low 16% 0.00 1.00 15% 21%
Middle 39% 0.00 1.00 38% 42%
High 45% 0.00 1.00 46% 37%
Union Membership 24% 0.00 1.00 27% 11%
Working Hours 32.28 8.75 0.00 48.00 32.60 8.02 30.73 11.57***
Job Satisfaction 2.71 0.69 0.00 4.00 2.75 0.68 2.53 0.74**
NB: * p < .05; ** p < .01, *** p < .001, two-tailed test.
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outcomes of these analyses. These tables show the b-estimates, standard error, significance of the
effects and the model fit, measured as the R2. All models were estimated using R 3.4.4 (R Core
Team 2018).
Property Deviance
Table 5 shows the results of the analyses pertaining to property deviance, i.e., serious acts of
deviant behavior, aimed at the organization. Model 1 shows that temporary employees more
frequently display such behavior than permanent employees (b = 0.36): this indicates that, in
general, temporary employees score almost half a standard deviation (0.36/0.85) higher on the
property deviance scale. This finding is in line with Hypothesis 1. Furthermore, we see that
employees who experience more social cohesion (b = 0.11) and less task cohesion (b = −0.09)
are also more likely to engage in property deviance.
We add the control variables in Model 2. Here, we see that younger employees more
often display property deviance (b = − 0.24). Also, a higher number of working hours is
positively related to property deviance (b = 0.09). None of the other control variables are
related to property deviance. Thus, engaging in property deviance is not related to sex,
educational level, union membership, or job satisfaction. Furthermore, adding the control
variables (somewhat) reduces the effect sizes of the temporary contract dummy and task
cohesion but does not lead to different conclusions regarding Hypothesis 1. This model
explains about nine percent of the total variance.
To test Hypothesis 2, which stated that social cohesion would strengthen the effect of
temporary employment, and Hypothesis 3, which stated that task cohesion would weaken
this effect, we include the interaction terms between cohesion and temporary contracts in
Model 3. The result shows that the relationship between temporary work and property
deviance is not moderated by social cohesion nor task cohesion. We thus find no support
for Hypothesis 2 and 3.
Table 5. OLS regression of property deviance (N = 787).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Temporary Contract 0.36*** 0.08 0.26** 0.08 0.20* 0.09
Social Cohesion 0.11*** 0.03 0.10** 0.03 0.07* 0.03
Task Cohesion −0.09** 0.03 −0.08* 0.04 −0.05 0.04
Interaction Temporary Contract with:
… Social Cohesion 0.16 0.08
… Task Cohesion −0.15 0.08
Control Variables
Sex (Reference = Female) 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.07
Age (Logged) −0.24*** 0.05 −0.25*** 0.05
Educational Level (Reference = Low)
Middle −0.11 0.09 −0.10 0.09
High −0.16 0.09 −0.15 0.09
Union Membership −0.03 0.07 −0.03 0.07
Working Hours a 0.09* 0.04 0.09* 0.04
Job Satisfaction 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.05
Intercept −0.06 0.03 0.50* 0.24 0.52 0.24
R2 0.05 0.09 0.10
aWe multiplied the coefficients for working hours by ten because the original coefficients were small.
NB: * p < .05; ** p < .01, *** p < .001, two-tailed test.
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Production Deviance
We now turn to the models explaining production deviance, i.e., minor acts of deviant
behavior aimed at the organization. In Model 4 in Table 6, we see that having a temporary
contract is positively related to production deviance (b = 0.25). Hence, compared to
permanent employees, temporary employees more frequently display production
deviance. This finding supports Hypothesis 1. However, when we compare this to the
standard deviance of the production deviance scale, we see that this effect is small: having
a temporary contract leads to an increase of approximately one quarter of an SD (.25/.88).
Furthermore, we find that social cohesion and task cohesion are significantly related to
production deviance. Here, we see that experiencing more social cohesion induces pro-
duction deviance (b = 0.07), and task cohesion reduces production deviance (b = − 0.12).
We add the control variables in Model 5 and find that age is the only control variable
that has a significant impact on production deviance: younger people more frequently
engage in production deviance (b = − 0.29) Furthermore, we now see that having
a temporary contract no longer has a significant effect on production deviance. These
findings do not support Hypothesis 1, which states that temporary employees more
frequently display deviant behavior. This model explains nine percent of the total variance.
Moderating Effects of Cohesion
We include the interaction terms in Model 6. The findings show that both social cohesion
and task cohesion moderate the effect of having a temporary contract on production
deviance. First, we see that the main effect of having a temporary contract does not
significantly deviate from zero (b = 0.04, p > .05). Thus, we find no differences in
production deviance between temporary and permanent employees with average social
cohesion and task cohesion values (i.e., when social cohesion and task cohesion are zero).
However, significant interaction terms indicate that, compared to permanent employees,
temporary employees are more likely to display production deviance when levels of social
cohesion are higher (b = 0.21) and levels of task cohesion are lower (b = − 0.18).
Table 6. OLS regression of production deviance (N = 787).
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Temporary Contract 0.25** 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.04 0.09
Social Cohesion 0.07* 0.03 0.08* 0.03 0.04 0.04
Task Cohesion −0.12*** 0.03 −0.09* 0.04 −0.06 0.04
Interaction Temporary Contract with:
… Social Cohesion 0.21** 0.08
… Task Cohesion −0.18* 0.08
Control Variables
Sex (Reference = Female) 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07
Age (Logged) −0.29*** 0.05 −0.30*** 0.05
Educational Level (Reference = Low)
Middle 0.02 0.09 0.04 0.09
High −0.05 0.09 −0.04 0.09
Union Membership −0.09 0.07 −0.09 0.07
Working Hours a 0.10 0.04 0.07 0.04
Job Satisfaction −0.04 0.05 −0.04 0.05
Intercept −0.04 0.03 0.76** 0.25 0.79** 0.25
R2 0.04 0.09 0.09
aWe multiplied the coefficients for working hours by ten because the original coefficients were small.
NB: * p < .05; ** p < .01, *** p < .001, two-tailed test.
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We created a graphical display of these interaction effects. Figure 1 shows that the effect of
social cohesion on production deviance differs for people with a temporary contract from that
for people with a permanent contract, while keeping all other variables at their mean. Here, we
see that there is virtually no effect of social cohesion on the display of production deviance
among employees with a permanent contract (b = 0.04; p > .05). This is in sharp contrast with
the effect of social cohesion on production deviance for temporary employees: here, we see
a strong positive effect of social cohesion (b = 0.04 + b = 0.21). From Figure 1 we learn that, for
low levels of social cohesion, temporary employees are less likely than permanent employees
to display production deviance, while they are more likely than permanent employees to do so
when levels of social cohesion are high. These findings support Hypothesis 2, which states that
the relationship between temporary workers and deviant behavior is stronger when social
cohesion is higher.
We present the moderation effect of task cohesion on the relationship between having
a temporary contract and production deviance in Figure 2. We see that permanent employees
are somewhat less likely to engage in production deviance when levels of task cohesion are
higher, although this finding is not significant (b = − 0.06, p > .05). For temporary employees,
we see a strong effect of task cohesion: compared to permanent employees, temporary
employees more frequently display production deviance when task cohesion is absent.
However, these differences quickly diminish when task cohesion increases. These findings
thus indicate that the relationship between temporary workers and deviant behavior is weaker
when task cohesion is higher, as predicted by Hypothesis 3.
Personal Aggression
Table 7 shows the results of the analyses pertaining to personal aggression – serious
deviant behavior aimed at others in the organization. Model 7 shows that temporary
employees more often display personal aggression than permanent employees (b = 0.19).
Table 7. OLS regression of personal aggression (N = 787).
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Temporary Contract 0.19** 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.03 0.08
Social Cohesion 0.12*** 0.03 0.12*** 0.03 0.08* 0.03
Task Cohesion −0.17*** 0.03 −0.16*** 0.04 −0.13*** 0.04
Interaction Temporary Contract with:
… Social Cohesion 0.21** 0.08
… Task Cohesion −0.17* 0.08
Control Variables
Sex (Reference = Female) 0.22** 0.07 0.22*** 0.07
Age (Logged) −0.23*** 0.05 −0.24*** 0.05
Educational Level (Reference = Low)
Middle −0.14 0.09 −0.12 0.08
High −0.17* 0.09 −0.16 0.09
Union Membership −0.04 0.07 −0.04 0.07
Working Hours a 0.16*** 0.04 0.16*** 0.04
Job Satisfaction 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.05
Intercept −0.03 0.03 0.21 0.24 0.24 0.24
R2 0.06 0.14 0.15
aWe multiplied the coefficients for working hours by ten because the original coefficients were small.
NB: * p < .05; ** p < .01, *** p < .001, two-tailed test.
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Similar to production deviance, this effect is moderate, but the finding supports the first
hypothesis. We also find that workplace cohesion is crucial in understanding personal
aggression. Personal aggression occurs more often when social cohesion is high (b = 0.12)
and task cohesion is low (b = − 0.17).
We add the control variables in Model 8. We find that men more frequently display
personal aggression than women (b = 0.22). Furthermore, younger employees more
frequently display personal aggression (b = − 0.23). Employees with higher education
less often engage in personal aggression than employees with less education (b = − 0.17).
Working more hours per week also leads to more personal aggression (b = 0.16). The
other control variables are not related to personal aggression. After adding the control
variables, we see that temporary employees and permanent employees no longer differ in
terms of personal aggression, thereby refuting Hypothesis 1. Adding the control variables
does not alter our conclusions with regard to the effects of workplace cohesion. This
model explains about fourteen percent of the total variance.
To test the interaction hypotheses, we include the interaction terms in Model 9. Similar
to our findings for production deviance, we see that there are no differences in personal
aggression among temporary and permanent employees with average levels of social
cohesion and task cohesion (i.e., when social cohesion and task cohesion are zero,
b = 0.03; p > 0,05). The significant interaction terms show that temporary employees
Figure 1. Effects of social cohesion on production deviance for temporary and permanent employees.
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more frequently display personal aggression than permanent employees when levels of
social cohesion are higher (b = 0.21) and levels of task cohesion are lower (b = − 0.17).
To ease the interpretation of these interaction effects, we graphically present the effects
of the interactions in Figures 3 and 4 while keeping the other variables at their mean. In
Figure 3, we see that permanent employees are more likely to display personal aggression
when social cohesion is higher (b = 0.08). The same holds for temporary employees, but
the steep slope of the blue line indicates that the effect of social cohesion is stronger for
temporary employees than for permanent employees (b = 0.21). This finding is in line
with Hypothesis 2.
Figure 4 shows that task cohesion reduces personal aggression. Similar to the previous
moderation effects, we see that this effect is stronger for temporary employees than for
permanent employees (b = −0.10). This finding supports Hypothesis 3.
Table 8 summarizes the consequences of our findings for the three hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1 stated that temporary workers more often engage in deviant behavior
than employees with a permanent contract. In our study, this hypothesis is supported
for property deviance, but we find no direct effects of having a temporary contract
Figure 2. Effects of task cohesion on production deviance for temporary and permanent employees.
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on production deviance and personal aggression. We find support for a moderation
effect of social cohesion on the temporary employment-deviant behavior relationship
(Hypothesis 2) for each type of deviant behavior. Support for a moderation effect of
task cohesion (Hypothesis 3) is found for production deviance and personal
aggression.5,6
Discussion and Conclusions
With the increased popularity of hiring temporary workers, this practice’s effects have
been thoroughly studied in the academic literature. Temporary work is considered a tool
to reduce unemployment (Gebel 2013). For employers, temporary work is often under-
stood as beneficial because it allows employers to adapt the personnel size to cyclical
changes (De Grip, Hoevenberg, and Willems 1997). However, it may be more detrimental
for temporary workers themselves because it hinders their career development (Scherer
2005; Steijn, Need, and Gesthuizen 2006) and increases insecurity and stress (De Cuyper
et al., 2008). The extent to which temporary work has unintended consequences for the
Figure 3. Effects of social cohesion on personal aggression for temporary and permanent employees.
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organization is unclear. Few studies have investigated potential moderators of the relation-
ship between holding a temporary contract and organizational behavior, and even fewer
studies have focused on neglect or deviant behavior (cf. De Cuyper et al., 2008; Berntson
et al. 2010). In this study, we therefore examine the extent to which temporary work
affects deviant behavior at the workplace and the extent to which this relationship is
affected by workplace cohesion. We predicted that temporary workers more often engage in
deviant behavior than employees with a permanent contract (Hypothesis 1) since tempor-
ary work is associated with higher levels of work-related stress and perceptions of unjust
treatment through poorer work conditions while also decreasing the opportunities to
voice complaints about stress and unjust treatment.
Figure 4. Effects of task cohesion on personal aggression for temporary and permanent employees.









Temporary workers more often engage in deviant behavior
than employees with a permanent contract
Support No Support No Support
Hypothesis 2:
The relationship between temporary workers and deviant
behavior is stronger when social cohesion is higher
No Support Support Support
Hypothesis 3:
The relationship between temporary workers and deviant
behavior is weaker when task cohesion is higher
No Support Support Support
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In addition, we expected workplace cohesion to moderate the relationship between
temporary work and deviant behavior. Temporary workers who work in social cohesive
groups, where deviant behavior is not discouraged, or even may be encouraged as an act of
resistance will be more likely to engage in deviant behavior (Hypothesis 2). In contrast, we
expected that temporary workers will be less likely to engage in deviant behavior when
they experience more task cohesion (Hypothesis 3) because deviant behavior is punished
within such groups.
We used data from the Work and Politics 2016 data set, which contains information
from approximately 1,467 respondents in the Netherlands. We selected respondents in
waged employment with colleagues, enabling us to study 787 respondents. We then
distinguished between people with a fixed, temporary contract – temporary workers –
and people with a permanent full-time or part-time contract. Based on the principal
component analysis, we further distinguished between three forms of deviant behavior at
the workplace: Production deviance (i.e., minor acts of deviant behavior aimed at the
organization, such as wasting time during work), property deviance (i.e., serious acts of
deviant behavior aimed at the organization, such as stealing company property/finances)
and personal aggression (i.e., serious deviant behavior aimed at others in the organization,
such as verbal abuse). We applied OLS regression analyses on all three scales to test our
hypotheses (see summary in Table 8).
First, our findings showed that there is only evidence for a direct effect of temporary
work on one type of deviant behavior. Temporary workers and permanent workers only
differ significantly regarding property deviance but not with respect to production
deviance or personal aggression. We thus find mixed evidence with regard to the first
hypothesis, which stated that temporary workers more often engage in deviant behavior.
Apparently, contract type is not directly related to “minor” acts of anti-organizational
behavior but has an effect on more serious acts of deviant behavior aimed at the
organization.
Second, we studied the moderating role of workplace cohesion, where we distinguished
between task cohesion – the extent to which employees work in a cohesive team to reach
the teams’ objectives – and social cohesion – the extent to which employees have social
ties with their colleagues, also outside working hours. Our findings show that people who
experience more social cohesion and less task cohesion are more often involved in each
type of workplace deviance. With regard to the moderating effect of workplace cohesion,
we found that the relationship between temporary work and deviant behavior is weakened
by task cohesion, and reinforced by social cohesion, which is in line with Hypotheses 2
and 3. Both moderation hypotheses hold in the case of production deviance and personal
aggression. The only exception is property deviance, for which no moderation effect of
social cohesion is found but which, in turn, was also the only form of deviant behavior
that yielded a direct effect of temporary employment. Apparently, property deviance is less
dependent on its social context.
In sum, we conclude that temporary work is associated with more deviant behavior
primarily under certain conditions. Compared to employees on permanent contracts, tem-
porary workers more often engage in deviant behavior when social cohesion is high and task
cohesion is low. While temporary workers do not display production deviance or personal
aggression more often than permanent workers, they do engage more often in this type of
behavior when social cohesion is higher and less often when task cohesion is higher.
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Our work contributes to the existing literature on deviant behavior and worker
resistance by showing that workplace cohesion is crucial for the relationship between
temporary work and deviant behavior. This is an important finding because it implies that
temporary work does not lead to deviant behavior per se. To understand how workplace
cohesion plays a role, the distinction between task cohesion – which reflects the way
colleagues work together as a team to complete tasks – and social cohesion – which
reflects how colleagues relate – is key. The relationship between temporary employment
and deviant behavior is weaker when task cohesion is higher. As we have argued, this may
tap into the corrective forces of social networks (Horne 2001). Following this line of
reasoning, deviant behavior is not tolerated in task-cohesive teams because it hinders the
opportunity to reach their goals. On the other hand, we found that social cohesion
reinforces the negative effect of temporary work on deviant behavior. We argue that
this aspect of social cohesion is counterproductive for correcting deviant behavior since
reprimanding group members can endanger the group as a whole and even may enforce
norms encouraging deviant behavior, e.g. as acts of resistance (Hodson 2001; Lucas et al.
2017). In such instances, group members’ engagement in deviant behavior may actually
operate as a way to develop and improve relationships between coworkers and gain the
trust of workers. All in all, the extent to which temporary work has negative outcomes for
the organization hinges on the integration of temporary workers in the organization. The
complex role of workplace cohesion is an important insight from which employers
managing (the integration of) temporary workers may profit. Integration is important:
research has shown that the loyalty of permanent workers to an organization is eroded
when employers hire temporary personnel (Davis-Blake, Broschak, and George 2003).
Although, the WOPO2016 data set offers a unique opportunity to examine deviant
behavior in the workplace among temporary and permanent workers, two limitations
should be discussed. First, our theorizing about social cohesion involves assumptions at
the organizational level, particularly regarding group norms and interactions between
team members. In our empirical analysis, cohesion is measured at the individual level
and not at the (aggregated) organizational level. Unfortunately, the available data do not
include further information on the organizations or teams in which people work. Future
research may further explore the role of colleagues. Multilevel analyses may be carried out
to establish how and under what conditions employee characteristics and team/organiza-
tional characteristics interact to stimulate (or mitigate) deviant behavior. Our findings
indicate that task cohesion and social cohesion affect the relation between contract types
and two types of deviant behavior. To further scrutinize the role of group norms on
people within a team, it would be interesting to study deviant behavior among members of
the same team. We therefore encourage future researchers to study the moderating effect
of workplace cohesion on the relationship between temporary work and deviant behavior
in a within- and between-organization design. Second, the cross-sectional nature of the
WOPO2016 data set does not allow us to test causal relations, and we must be careful with
a causal interpretation of the findings. Further research into the effect of workplace
cohesion will therefore benefit from panel data. This especially holds true for the negative
association between temporary work and deviant behavior. While it appears (theoretically)
plausible that being a temporary worker induces deviant behavior, the opposite may also
be the case: people may not obtain a permanent contract because they engage in deviant
behavior (and are caught).
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Notes
1. The OECD index for Employment Protections Legislation (EPL) is an indicator for the
strictness of a country’s EPL. The index ranges from 0 (no protection) to 5 (highest
protection). According to this index, EPL for permanent workers is 2.9 (OECD countries’
average being 2), while that for temporary workers is 1.2 (OECD countries’ average being
1.7). Index and methodology available at: http://www.oecd.org/employment/emp/oecdindica
torsofemploymentprotection.htm.
2. https://www.eerstekamer.nl/wetsvoorstel/35074_wet_arbeidsmarkt_in_balans.
3. Others propose that temporary workers will be more productive because their temporary
work could serve as a stepping stone for a permanent position. Empirical evidence shows that
this mechanism only is observable if employers use temporary work as a screening device and
is absent when temporary work is temporary by the nature of the work for which temporary
workers are hired (Engellandt & Riphahn, 2005; Broschak, Davis-Blake & Block, 2008).
4. Pearson’s r correlations between all variables in the model are presented in Table A1.
5. The dependent variables in our analyses are skewed, although the use of factors somewhat
reduces this problem. To test the robustness of our findings we also ran Poison-analyses with
the number of deviant acts as the dependent variable. The results of these additional analyses
(available on request) lead to similar conclusions regarding our hypotheses, except for
Hypothesis 3 for personal aggression: task cohesion does not affect the relations between
permanent and temporary workers and personal aggression.
6. We also examined whether our outcomes were affected by outliers. OLS regression analyses
without outliers (available on request) also lead to similar conclusions regarding our hypoth-
eses. However, we no longer find support for Hypothesis 2 for personal aggression: in these
analyses, social cohesion does not affect the relations between permanent and temporary
workers and personal aggression.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Funding
This research was funded by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO; Dutch
Research Council), Project number [432-080-122].
Notes on contributors
Agnes Akkerman is professor of Labour Market Institutions and Labour Relations at the
Department of Economics, Radboud University Nijmegen. She also holds the James Coleman
chair in Sustainable Industrial Relations at the Department of Sociology, University of
Groningen, The Netherlands. Her research interest include industrial conflict, co-determination
and worker participation and voice; protest mobilization and repression. She has recently published
in the American Journal of Sociology, Work, Employment and Society, and Comparative Political
Studies. Email: a.akkerman@fm.ru.nl
Roderick Sluiter is a postdoctoral researcher in the Economics Department and lecturer in the
Political Science Department, both at the Institute of Management Research at Radboud University.
His research interests include workplace voice, precarious work, and the effects of workplace
experiences on political behavior and preferences. He has recently published his research in journals
such as the American Journal of Sociology, Social Science Research and Political Studies. Email: r.
sluiter@fm.ru.nl
THE SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY 697
Giedo Jansen is Assistant Professor at the University of Twente, Department of Public
Administration, the Netherlands. His research is on the intersection of sociology, political science,
and labor relations. His research interests include the effects of flexibilization, globalization and
technological change on work and other aspects of social and political life. He has recently
published in these areas in journals such as the American Journal of Sociology, New Media and





Akkerman, A., G. Jansen, A. Lehr, R. Sluiter, and A. Zaslove. 2016. Work and Politics 2016 Dataset.
Nijmegen: Radboud University Nijmegen.
Akkerman, A., M. J. Born, and R. Torenvlied. 2013. “Solidarity, Strikes, and Scabs: How
Participation Norms Affect Union Members’ Willingness to Strike.” Work and Occupations 40
(3):250–280. doi: 10.1177/0730888413481481.
Analoui, F. and A. Kakabadse. 1993. “Industrial Conflict and Its Expressions.” Employee Relations
15 (1):46–62. doi: 10.1108/EUM0000000001032.
Bacon, N. and J. Storey. 1993. “Individualization of the Employment Relationship and the Implications
for Trade Unions.” Employee Relations 15 (1):5–17. doi: 10.1108/01425459310024893.
Bennett, N. and S. E. Naumann. 2005. “Understanding and Preventing Shirking, Job Neglect, Social
Loafing, and Free Riding.” Pp. 113–129 in Managing Organizational Deviance, edited by R. E.
Kidwell and L. Martin. Sage Publications.
Berntson, E., K. Näswall, M. Sverke, M. Sverke, H. De Witte, K. Näswall, and J. Hellgren. 2010. “The
Moderating Role of Employability in the Association between Job Insecurity and Exit, Voice,
Loyalty and Neglect.” Economic and Industrial Democracy 31 (2):215–30. doi: 10.1177/
0143831X09358374.
Bordia, P., S. L. D. Restubog, and R. L. Tang. 2008. “When Employees Strike Back: Investigating
Mediating Mechanisms between Psychological Contract Breach and Workplace Deviance.”
Journal of Applied Psychology 93 (5):1104. doi: 10.1037/0021-9010.93.5.1104.
Born, M., A. Akkerman, and K. Thommes. 2016. “Peer Influence on Protest Participation:
Communication and Trust between Co-workers as Inhibitors or Facilitators of Mobilization.”
Social Science Research 56:58–72. doi: 10.1016/j.ssresearch.2015.11.003.
Born, M., A. Akkerman, and R. Torenvlied. 2013. “Trust Your Boss or Listen to the Union?
Information, Social Identification, Trust, and Strike Participation.” Mobilization: An
International Quarterly 18 (2):161–178.
Brock, M. E., L. E. Martin, and M. R. Buckley. 2013. “Time Theft in Organizations: The
Development of the Time Banditry Questionnaire.” International Journal of Selection and
Assessment 21 (3):309–21. doi: 10.1111/ijsa.2013.21.issue-3.
Brockner, J., G. Ackerman, J. Greenberg, M. J. Gelfand, A. M. Francesco, Z. X. Chen, K. Leung,
G. Bierbrauer, C. Gomez, B.L. Kirman, et al. 2001. “Culture and Procedural Justice: The Influence
of Power Distance on Reactions to Voice.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 37
(4):300–15. doi: 10.1006/jesp.2000.1451.
Broschak, J. P., A. Davis-Blake, and E. S. Block. 2008. “Nonstandard, Not Substandard: The
Relationship among Work Arrangements, Work Attitudes, and Job Performance.” Work and
Occupations 35 (1):3–43. doi: 10.1177/0730888407309604.
Carless, S. A. and C. De Paola. 2000. “The Measurement of Cohesion in Work Teams.” Small Group
Research 31 (1):71–88. doi: 10.1177/104649640003100104.
698 A. AKKERMAN ET AL.
Carron, A. V., W. N. Widmeyer, and L. R. Brawley. 1985. “The Development of an Instrument to
Assess Cohesion in Sport Teams: The Group Environment Questionnaire.” Journal of Sport
Psychology 7 (3):244–66. doi: 10.1123/jsp.7.3.244.
Coleman, J. S. 1994. Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Connelly, C. E. and D. G. Gallagher. 2004. “Emerging Trends in Contingent Work Research.”
Journal of Management 30 (6):959–83. doi: 10.1016/j.jm.2004.06.008.
Coyle-Shapiro, J. A. and N. Conway. 2004. “The Employment Relationship through the Lens of
Social Exchange.” Pp. 5–28 in The Employment Relationship: Examining Psychological and
Contextual Perspectives, edited by J. A. Coyle-Shapiro, L. M. Shore, S. Taylor, and L. E. Tetrick.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Croucher, R. and C. Brewster. 1998. “Flexible Working Practices and the Trade Unions.” Employee
Relations 20 (5):443–52. doi: 10.1108/01425459810238710.
Davis-Blake, A., J. P. Broschak, and E. George. 2003. “Happy Together? How Using Nonstandard
Workers Affects Exit, Voice, and Loyalty among Standard Employees.” Academy of Management
Journal 46 (4):475–85.
De Cuyper, N., J. De Jong, H. De Witte, K. Isaksson, T. Rigotti, and R. Schalk. 2008. “Literature
Review of Theory and Research on the Psychological Impact of Temporary Employment:
Towards a Conceptual Model.” International Journal of Management Reviews 10 (1):25–51. doi:
10.1111/j.1468-2370.2007.00221.x.
De Grip, A., J. Hoevenberg, and E. Willems. 1997. “Atypical Employment in the European Union.”
International Labour Review 136 (1):47–71.
De Jong, J., R. Schalk, and T. Goessling. 2007. “An Institutional Perspective on the Employment
Position of Temporary Workers in the Netherlands.” Relations Industrielles/Industrial Relations
62 (3):492–515. doi: 10.7202/016490ar.
De Lange, M. 2013. “Causes and Consequences of Employment Flexibility among Young People.
Recent Developments in the Netherlands and Europe.” ICS Dissertation Series, Nijmegen.
De Witte, H. 2005. “Job Insecurity: Review of the International Literature on Definitions,
Prevalence, Antecedents and Consequences.” Journal of Industrial Psychology 31 (4):1–6.
Durkheim, E. 1951[1897]. Suicide. New York: Thee Free Press.
Dutch Statistics. 2015. Wat Zijn Flexwerkers? Dossier-Flexwerk. Den Haag/Heerlen: CBS. Retrieved
January 9, 2020 (https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/dossier/dossier-flexwerk/hoofdcategorieen/wat-zijn-
flexwerkers-).
Dutch Statistics. 2016. “Bevolking per Maand; Leeftijd, Geslacht, Herkomst, Generatie.” Statline
(Archief). Den Haag/Heerlen: CBS.
Engellandt, A., and R. T. Riphahn. 2005. “Temporary Contracts and Employee Effort.” Labour
Economics 12 (3):281–299. doi: 10.1016/j.labeco.2003.11.006.
Eurostat. 2015. “Employment Statistics – Statistics Explained (Version, October 2013).” Retrieved May
10, 2019 (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Employment_statistics).
Farrell, D. 1983. “Exit, Voice, Loyalty, and Neglect as Responses to Job Dissatisfaction:
A Multidimensional Scaling Study.” Academy of Management Journal 26:596–607.
Gebel, M. 2013. “Is A Temporary Job Better than Unemployment? A Cross-country Comparison
Based on British, German, and Swiss Panel Data.” SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data
Research 543. Berlin: Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung – DIW Berlin.
Greenberg, J. 1990. “Employee Theft as a Reaction to Underpayment Inequity: The Hidden Cost of
Pay Cuts.” Journal of Applied Psychology 75 (5):561. doi: 10.1037/0021-9010.75.5.561.
Hijzen, A., L. Mondauto, and S. Scarpetta. 2017. “The Impact of Employment Protection on
Temporary Employment: Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design.” Labour
Economics 46:64–76. doi: 10.1016/j.labeco.2017.01.002.
Hirsch, B. and S. Mueller. 2012. “The Productivity Effect of Temporary Agency Work: Evidence
from German Panel Data.” The Economic Journal 122 (562):F216–F235. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-
0297.2012.02536.x.
Hirschman, A.O. 1970. Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Hodson, R. 2001. Dignity at Work. New York: Cambridge University Press.
THE SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY 699
Hollinger, R.C. 1986. “Acts against the Workplace: Social Bonding and Employee Deviance.”
Deviant Behavior 7 (1):53–75. doi: 10.1080/01639625.1986.9967695.
Horne, C. 2001. “The Enforcement of Norms: Group Cohesion and Meta-norms.” Social Psychology
Quarterly 64:253–66. doi: 10.2307/3090115.
Itzkovich, Y. and S. Heilbrunn. 2016. “The Role of Co-workers’ Solidarity as an Antecedent of
Incivility and Deviant Behavior in Organizations.” Deviant Behavior 37 (8):861–76. doi: 10.1080/
01639625.2016.1152865.
Jansen, G., and A. Akkerman. 2014. “Collapse of Collective Action? Employment Flexibility and
Strikes in European Companies.” Pp. 186–207 in The Comparative Political Economy of Work
and Employment Relations, edited by M. Hauptmeier and M. Vidal. New York: Palgrave
MacMillan.
Jansen, G., A. Akkerman, and K. Vandaele. 2017. “Undermining Mobilization? The Effect of Job
Flexibility and Job Instability on The Willingness to Strike.” Economic and Industrial Democracy
38 (1):99–117. doi: 10.1177/0143831X14559782.
Kalleberg, A. L., B. F. Reskin, and K. Hudson. 2000. “Bad Jobs in America: Standard and
Nonstandard Employment Relations and Job Quality in the United States.” American
Sociological Review 65 (2):256–78. doi: 10.2307/2657440.
Karau, S. J. and K. D. Williams. 1997. “The Effects of Group Cohesiveness on Social Loafing and
Social Compensation.” Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice 1 (2):156. doi: 10.1037/
1089-2699.1.2.156.
Kidwell, R. E., Jr and C. Robie. 2003. “Withholding Effort in Organizations: Toward Development
and Validation of a Measure.” Journal of Business and Psychology 17 (4):537–61. doi: 10.1023/
A:1023456319134.
Kidwell, R. E. and N. Bennett. 2001. “Perceived Work Context and Employee Job Neglect.”
American Business Review 19:64–74.
Kitts, J. A. 2006. “Collective Action, Rival Incentives, and the Emergence of Antisocial Norms.”
American Sociological Review 71 (2):235–59. doi: 10.1177/000312240607100204.
Kolarska, L. and H. Aldrich. 1980. “Exit, Voice, and Silence. Consumers’ and Managers’ Responses to
Organizational Decline.” Organization Studies 1:41–58. doi: 10.1177/017084068000100104.
Koster, F., F. Stokman, R. Hodson, and K. Sanders. 2007. “Solidarity through Networks: The Effects
of Task and Informal Interdependence on Cooperation within Teams.” Employee Relations 29
(2):117–37. doi: 10.1108/01425450710719978.
Kremer, M., R. Went, and A. Knottnerus. 2017. Voor De Zekerheid. De Toekomst Van Flexibel
Werkenden En De Moderne Organisatie Van Arbeid. Den Haag: Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het
Regeringsbeleid.
Lucas, K., A. S. Manikas, E. S. Mattingly, and C. J. Crider. 2017. “Engaging and Misbehaving: How
Dignity Affects Employee Work Behaviors.” Organization Studies 38 (11):1505–27. doi: 10.1177/
0170840616677634.
Muffels, R. 2014. “Flexicurity in Tijden Van Crisis in Nederland En Europa: Een Vergelijkende Analyse
Van Sociale Modellen.” Mens En Maatschappij 89 (4):371–94. doi: 10.5117/MEM2014.4.MUFF.
Mullen, B. and C. Copper. 1994. “The Relation between Group Cohesiveness and Performance: An
Integration.” Psychological Bulletin 115 (2):210–27. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.115.2.210.
Near, J. P. and M. P. Miceli. 1986. “Retaliation against Whistle Blowers: Predictors and Effects.”
Journal of Applied Psychology 71 (1):137. doi: 10.1037/0021-9010.71.1.137.
OECD. 2017. OECD Employment Outlook 2017. Paris: OECD Publishing. doi:10.1787/empl_out-
look-2017-en.
Olsen, K. M. 2004. “Unions’ Dilemma When Firms Use Employment Intermediaries.” European
Sociological Review 21 (3):289–300. doi: 10.1093/esr/jci018.
Omar, F., F. Halim, A. Zainah, and H. Farhadi. 2011. “Stress and Job Satisfaction as Antecedents of
Workplace Deviant Behavior.” Deviant Behavior 16:17.
Paulsen, R. 2015. “Non-work at Work: Resistance or What?” Organization 22 (3):351–67. doi:
10.1177/1350508413515541.
700 A. AKKERMAN ET AL.
Penney, L.M. and P.E. Spector. 2002. “Narcissism and Counterproductive Work Behavior: Do
Bigger Egos Mean Bigger Problems?” International Journal of Selection and Assessment 10 (1/
2):126–34. doi: 10.1111/1468-2389.00199.
R Core Team. 2018. R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing. Vienna:
R Foundation for Statistical Computing.
Robinson, S. L. and A. M. O’Leary-Kelly. 1998. “Monkey See, Monkey Do: The Influence of Work
Groups on the Antisocial Behavior of Employees.” Academy of Management Journal 41 (6):658–72.
Robinson, S. L. and R. J. Bennett. 1995. “A Typology of Deviant Workplace Behaviors:
A Multidimensional Scaling Study.” Academy of Management Journal 38 (2):555–72.
Roscigno, V. J. and R. Hodson. 2004. “The Organizational and Social Foundations of Worker
Resistance.” American Sociological Review 69 (1):14–39. doi: 10.1177/000312240406900103.
Rusbult, C. E., I. M. Zembrodt, and L. K. Gunn. 1982. “Exit, Voice, Loyalty, and Neglect: Responses
to Dissatisfaction in Romantic Involvements.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
43:1230–42. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.43.6.1230.
Sampson, R. J., S. W. Raudenbush, and F. Earls. 1997. “Neighborhoods and Violent Crime:
A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy.” Science 277 (5328):918–24. doi: 10.1126/
science.277.5328.918.
Scherer, S. 2005. “Patterns of Labour Market Entry – Long Wait or Career Instability? an Empirical
Comparison of Italy, Great Britain and West Germany.” European Sociological Review 21
(5):427–40. doi: 10.1093/esr/jci029.
Skarlicki, D. P. and R. Folger. 1997. “Retaliation in the Workplace: The Roles of Distributive,
Procedural, and Interactional Justice.” Journal of Applied Psychology 82 (3):434. doi: 10.1037/
0021-9010.82.3.434.
Steijn, B., A. Need, and M. Gesthuizen. 2006. “Well Begun, Half Done? Long-term Effects of Labour
Market Entry in the Netherlands, 1950–2000.” Work, Employment and Society 20 (3):453–72. doi:
10.1177/0950017006066996.
Svensson, J. and M. van Genugten. 2013. “Retaliation against Reporters of Unequal Treatment:
Failing Employee Protection in the Netherlands.” Equality, Diversity and Inclusion: an
International Journal 32 (2):129–43. doi: 10.1108/02610151311324370.
Sverke, M., J. Hellgren, and K. Näswall. 2002. “No Security: A Meta-analysis and Review of Job
Insecurity and Its Consequences.” Journal of Occupational Health Psychology 7 (3):242. doi:
10.1037/1076-8998.7.3.242.
Thommes, K., and A. Akkerman. 2018. “Clean up Your Network: How a Strike Changed the Social
Networks of a Working Team.” Team Performance Management: An International Journal 24 (1/
2):43–63. doi:10.1108/TPM-06-2017-0031.
Tucker, J. 1989. “Employee Theft as Social Control.” Deviant Behavior 10 (4):319–34. doi: 10.1080/
01639625.1989.9967820.
Vallas, S. P. 2003. “The Adventures of Managerial Hegemony: Teamwork, Ideology, and Worker
Resistance.” Social Problems 50 (2):204–25. doi: 10.1525/sp.2003.50.2.204.
Vallas, S. P. 2006. “Empowerment Redux: Structure, Agency, and the Remaking of Managerial
Authority.” American Journal of Sociology 111 (6):1677–717. doi: 10.1086/499909.
Van Adrichem, M. and F. Koster. 2013. “Een Wankel Evenwicht. Deviant Werknemersgedrag En
Het Psychologische Contract.” Mens & Maatschappij 88 (4):375–99. doi: 10.5117/MEM2013.4.
ADRI.
Zaccaro, S.J. 1991. “Nonequivalent Associations between Forms of Cohesiveness and Group-Related
Outcomes: Evidence for Multidimensionality.” The Journal of Social Psychology 131 (3):387–99.
doi: 10.1080/00224545.1991.9713865.












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































702 A. AKKERMAN ET AL.
